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Abstract  
 
Pareto-improving tax coordination, and even tax harmonization, are Nash implementable 
between sovereign countries without any supranational tax authorities. Following Schelling's 
approach, we consider voluntary commitment, which constrains countries' respective tax 
rate choices. We develop a commitment game where countries choose their strategy sets in 
preliminary stages and play consistently during the final one. We determine the set of tax 
rates, which are implementable by commitment. This allows countries to reach Pareto-
improving equilibriums. We also establish that complete tax harmonization may emerge as 
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the commitment game as long as the asymmetry 
between countries remains limited. Our analysis contributes to the rationale of tax ranges 
and, more broadly, of non binding but self-enforcing commitments (not equivalent to cheap 
talk) in the context of tax competition. 
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1 Introduction
How may tax coordination and even harmonization be implemented among tax sovereign countries? This
issue is especially puzzling in the economic literature in which sovereignty involves a decentralized equilibrium,
while coordination or harmonization often relies on a centralized solution at an international level. A sovereign
state displays internal control and external independence from other states. It is the primary decision maker,
when it comes to other states. This basic deﬁnition of sovereignty justiﬁes the use of game theory to formalize
international relations. Consequently, tax competition is usually described through the Nash equilibrium of
a simultaneous moves game (see Keen, 2008; or Keen and Konrad, 2012). Tax coordination generally results
from a normative approach, through the assumption that some centralization occurs (e.g., a supranational
tax agency's ability to deal with international tax spillovers as in Tanzi, 1999).1 However, in a world of
sovereign states, there is, by deﬁnition, no supranational government with the legitimate authority to enforce
a regulation on national taxation. Even in the European Union (EU), taxation's issues remain subject to
the unanimity of the member countries, while qualiﬁed majority voting applies to many other issues. Any
attempt to harmonize or coordinate national tax policy seems to threaten national ﬁscal sovereignty.2
The aim of this paper is to go beyond this deadlock by considering the fact that tax sovereign countries are
able to fulﬁll some commitments, which allow them to implement tax coordination, and even to reach tax
harmonization,3 while remaining the unique tax policy makers and the tax sovereigns. We determine under
which conditions tax coordination/harmonization may occur at the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative
game without the delegation of tax power to a supranational authority. Such commitments consist of the
voluntary restrictions that countries impose upon their own tax policies. These commitments are nonbinding,
but self-enforcing and credible. Countries are able to reach Pareto-superior equilibriums and even under some
conditions, to achieve tax harmonization. We develop a metagame, more speciﬁcally, a commitment game.
During the preliminary stages, the number of which is not limited, both countries announce their respective
strategies' sets and modify them as much as they want. At the ﬁnal stage, each country chooses its tax
rate according to its last commitment. By determining which rates are achievable through this commitment
device, we establish that a Pareto-improving tax coordination is Nash implementable, where each country
chooses a distinct tax rate. We emphasize that a voluntary commitment to a minimum tax rate is possible
1This approach goes beyond the tax competition issue and has been adopted in the debate on the centralized versus de-
centralized provision of a public good in the presence of interjurisdictional spillovers (see for instance, Oates, 1972; or, more
recently, Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro, 2005).
2The conundrum of sovereignty versus international coordination is not restricted to tax competition. In international trade,
for instance, Bagwell and Staiger (2001) consider the Nash equilibrium to be a benchmark world in which sovereign countries
have not ratiﬁed any international agreements. International agreements are designed to correct ineﬃciencies resulting from
spillover eﬀects across countries. However, these agreements directly compromise national sovereignty.
3In the classical approach of international tax interactions, tax competition is unidimensional: Countries compete in their tax
rates only. Tax harmonization is an extreme form of tax coordination, implemented by imposing the same rate among countries.
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and Pareto improving, contrasting with previous results of inﬁnitely repeated games of tax competition,
where a minimum tax rate reduces the threat of punishment and aﬀects tax cooperation (see Kiss (2012)).
Finally, we consider tax harmonization, where all countries choose the same tax rate. We conclude that
harmonization may emerge from a decentralized equilibrium as long as asymmetry among countries remains
moderate.
We apply the implementation theory, with commitments under perfect information, to tax competition.4 We
study if and how it is possible to curb tax competition in order to reach a Pareto-improving equilibrium. Our
analysis focuses on a speciﬁc commitment device consisting of the voluntary restriction of countries' strategy
sets: Each country is able to rule out some actions, i.e. some values of their respective tax rates before tax
competition takes place. We then consider if tax coordination and harmonization are Nash implementable
through this mechanism, or if the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium(s) (SPNE) is Pareto-superior to the
Nash equilibrium of the standard tax competition game (coordination), and if a SPNE may be characterized
by a unique value of the equilibrium tax rate (harmonization).
Schelling (1960) highlights the role of commitments in improving players' outcomes. He extends Stackelberg
(1934), who emphasized the advantage of moving ﬁrst (leading) in a Cournot duopoly.5 Our analysis follows
Schelling's approach, which appears particularly adequate for studying international interactions, such as
tax competition, with respect to von Neumann's reduction to the normal form of noncooperative game.
Indeed, sovereign states have, by deﬁnition, the power to make voluntary commitments as emphasized by
Myerson (2009).6 Several authors have recently formalized some of Schelling's intuitions.7 Considering a
grand reaction function where players choose not only their strategy, but also the set of available actions,
Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010) establish a commitment folk theorem similar to the repeated game folk
theorem. Renou (2009) and Bade, Haeringer, and Renou (2009) develop commitment games, that are actually
metagames, where players restrict their strategy sets at preliminary stages, and then play accordingly. The
latter establishes a theorem, which reduces the analysis of successful commitments to the study of simple
4The implementation theory adds mechanisms to a game, such that the equilibrium of the game is socially optimal. We
assume here neither the existence of information imperfection, nor that of a social planner in charge of designing the game to be
played. Jackson (2001) and Palfrey (2002) provide useful surveys of this theory (with and without information imperfection).
5First, leading corresponds to pure unconditional commitment in Schelling's terminology, and also serves as one of the
commitment technologies studied by Schelling. Second, the existence of a ﬁrst-mover advantage in the Stackelberg duopoly
derives from some properties of the game: Strategic complementarity or substitutability, positive or negative spillovers, etc. For
instance, Amir and Stepanova (2006) show that players in a Bertrand duopoly display a second-mover advantage, preferring to
follow rather than lead.
6Myerson (2009) writes: "Strategy of Conﬂict demonstrated both the importance of noncooperative equilibrium analysis and
the inadequacy of doing it only in the normal form." Moreover, in his seminal paper on asymmetric tax competition, Bucovetsky
(1991) highlights that the "government may have better ability than colluding ﬁrms to make binding commitments."
7Some authors have formalized commitments in particular games. For instance, Crawford (1982) and Hart and Moore (2004)
demonstrate the role of commitment in bargaining, while Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and van Damme and Hurkens (1996)
study the eﬀect of unilateral commitment on a single pure strategy in duopoly.
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commitments, where one player engages himself in a unique action at the ﬁrst stage of the game.8 This result
makes the leader's behavior in the Stackelberg game crucial for our analysis, since the committing player
behaves as the leader of a Stackelberg: It maximizes a payoﬀ function, which explicitly takes into account
the reaction of the follower. However, our analysis departs from a standard Stackelberg game since we do not
restrict commitment to moving ﬁrst or second. We determine which tax rates are Nash implemented through
commitment in general, and are Pareto-improving with respect to the standard static tax competition game.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on tax competition/coordination in several ways. First, we adopt
a monotone comparative statics approach as formalized by Milgrom and Shannon (1994), and widely applied
in industrial organization literature (see Vives, 1999). Assuming positive tax spillovers9 and the strategic
complementarities of tax rates, we deduce several preliminary results, which hold for many models of tax
competition (capital or commodity tax competition). Second, we highlight the point that the perfect sub-
game Nash equilibriums of the commitment game are Pareto-superior to the Nash equilibrium of the standard
(static) game. The voluntary commitment to rule out some levels of tax rates allows countries to establish
some Pareto-improving coordination. Our approach provides some rationale regarding tax ranges as described
in Peralta and van Ypersele (2006), or other voluntary restrictions among jurisdictions with tax sovereignty.
Third, tax harmonization is Nash implementable through commitments when countries are not too asym-
metric.10 Here, harmonization is endogenous and unambiguously Pareto-improving, contrasting with a large
part of the related literature, where harmonization is an ad hoc hypothesis involving some redistribution
among countries (Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; or Zissimos and Wooders, 2008).
This article completes previous work on tax competition. In particular, Persson and Tabellini (1992) develop
a political economy model of tax competition, where the decisive (median) voter strategically delegates tax
policy to an individual with diﬀerent preferences. The commitment game we propose here is equivalent
in theory to a voluntary strategic delegation game under complete information, where each player/country
delegates its taxing power to an agent who has access to a narrower set of actions. Dhillon, Perroni, and
Scharf (1999) propose a tax competition framework where the preference for a public good in each jurisdiction
is private information. Tax competition may then survive despite tax rate coordination. While their analysis
is based on the mechanism design literature under imperfect information, we adopt a diﬀerent approach by
considering a voluntary commitment device under perfect information. Finally, we extend Kempf and Rota-
Graziosi (2010) and Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2014), who apply the endogenous timing game in duopoly,
8This theorem has the same implication than the direct revelation mechanism in the information theory in that it simpliﬁes
drastically the analysis of relevant commitments to study.
9Following Eaton (2004), we will use the term of plain complementarity of tax rates.
10Since we distinguish countries by their equilibrium tax rates in the standard (static) tax competition game, our approach
allows us to deal with diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity between countries (size, capital endowment, productivity, preference for
public spending, etc.).
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proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), respectively to capital and commodity tax competition. Both
articles conclude that the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game is not commitment robust. However,
the studied commitment device remains restricted to single actions (moving early or late) and the issue of
tax rate coordination/harmonization is not considered.
The rest of the paper includes the following: section 2 presents the standard tax competition game, its
main assumptions, and some preliminary results; section 3 develops the commitment game and our main
results; section 4 proposes an analytical illustration of our analysis with quadratic payoﬀ functions, which
encompasses several well-known models in the literature on capital tax competition; section 5 concludes.
2 The standard tax competition game
2.1 The set-up of the framework
The canonical framework of tax competition ascribed to Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986)
is a one-period two-country game where a single good is produced from two factors: labor, which is immobile
across countries, and capital, which is perfectly mobile. This mobility induces a tax spillover and tax policy
interactions between countries.
In order to capture these tax interactions, we consider the following strategic-form game, denoted by G.
We deﬁne G ≡
〈
{1, 2} , ([0, 1] ,W i)
i∈{1,2}
〉
, where the interval [0, 1] is the set of available tax rates for each
country and W i (ti, tj) : [0, 1]
2 → R is the payoﬀ function of country i. This function may correspond to a
welfare function, or collected tax revenue. It is assumed to be continuous in both arguments (ti and tj) and
concave in ti
(
W i11 (ti, tj) ≡ ∂2W i (ti, tj) /∂t2i < 0
)
.
Following the monotone comparative statics approach, we assume that objective functions and, consequently,
the tax competition game, exhibit two properties for any value of the tax rates in [0, 1]. The ﬁrst property
is positive tax spillover or, equivalently, the plain complementarity of tax rates as deﬁned by Eaton (2004).
Assumption (1): We assume the plain complementarity of tax rates, or equivalently
W i2 (ti, tj) ≡
∂W i (ti, tj)
∂tj
> 0. (1)
The plain complementarity property sums up several eﬀects, which have been identiﬁed in the tax competition
literature. For instance, considering the standard capital tax competition game, where the country's payoﬀ
function is its welfare function, involves at least three eﬀects: a tax base eﬀect, a capital income eﬀect
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(also called the terms of trade eﬀect), and the productivity eﬀect of immobile factors. The tax base eﬀect
corresponds to the following: an increase in country j's tax rate decreases the net return of capital in this
country and drives out capital from this country into country i. This ﬂow broadens the capital tax base of
country i and increases its tax revenue and payoﬀ function. The capital income eﬀect involves an opposite
relationship: due to the perfect mobility of the tax base (capital), an increase in tj decreases the worldwide
net return of capital, and aﬀects the capital owners in both countries negatively. If the weight of the capital
owners in the objective function is suﬃciently important,11 we may obtain the plain substitutability property
for the capital exporter country
(
W i2 (ti, tj) < 0
)
. Finally, the productivity eﬀect relies on the shape of the
production function: An increase in tj raises the level of capital in country i, and then increases the rent
from immobile factors, since the production function is usually assumed to be concave. By assuming plain
complementarity, we consider that the tax base eﬀect and the productivity eﬀect dominate the capital income
eﬀect. Section 4 provides a quadratic illustration of these eﬀects through two models of tax competition one
on capital, the other on commodity.12
The plain complementarity may be considered as a property of ﬁrst order, since its deﬁnition involves a
ﬁrst-order partial derivative of the objective function. Our second assumption, namely the strategic com-
plementarity of tax rates, is a second-order property of the payoﬀ functions and, consequently, of the tax
competition game. Here, we follow the deﬁnition of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).13
Assumption (2): We assume the strategic complementarity of tax rates, or equivalently
W i12 (ti, tj) ≡
∂2W i (ti, tj)
∂ti∂tj
> 0. (2)
Plain and strategic complementarities are assumed to hold for any values of the tax rates in order that the
reaction function of each country be monotone. These hypotheses describe the tax externality, which is often
considered in the literature on tax competition. Their combination also creates harmful tax competition, or
causes a detrimental race to the bottom, which would require some international tax coordination. Indeed,
under plain and strategic complementarities, a decrease in the tax rate of one country induces a negative
direct eﬀect on the welfare or tax revenue of the other country, and an indirect eﬀect through the reaction of
the other country, which reduces its own tax rate (and then, its revenue) as a best reply.14
11The international distribution of capital endowments plays a crucial role here.
12Our main results may also be established with plain substitutability since the commitment game proposed by Bade et al.
(2009) does not assumed this property.
13Rota-Graziosi (2016) establish suﬃcient conditions: the log-concavity and the 1/2-convexity of the marginal production
function to establish the strategic complementarity of tax rates in a standard capital tax competition when countries maximize
their respective tax revenues. An extension to welfare maximizers is not immediate (see the analysis of Vrijburg and Mooij,
2016, who establish the strategic substitutability of tax rates).
14The race to the top is also possible in this conﬁguration.
Études et Documents n° 12, CERDI, 2016
8
Several empirical works (Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002; Revelli, 2005; Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano,
2008; Kammas, 2011) conﬁrm the assumption of strategic complementarity by highlighting a positive slope
of countries' reaction functions in tax rates. Plain property has received less attention from the empirical
literature. However, a recent analysis (IMF, 2014) estimates the impact of neighboring countries on the
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) base for 103 countries over the period 1980-2013. It concludes with a signiﬁcant
and positive spillover base eﬀect, which is equivalent to our assumption of the plain complementarity of tax
rates.
If, by contrast, tax rates are plain substitutes and strategic complements, tax competition, which still induces
a race to the bottom due to the second property, would be beneﬁcial for both countries, since the decrease in
tax rates means an increase in the payoﬀ for both countries. Plain substitutability and strategic complemen-
tarity may also be considered as a reduced form of the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) approach, where tax
competition is an expedient for taming the Leviathan. However, the Public Choice school usually introduces
a critical distinction between the population's welfare and the payoﬀ of the decision maker, which is beyond
the scope of our analysis. The strategic substitutability of tax rates is more debatable in tax competition.
This property would prevent the relevance of tax coordination, since a decrease in the tax rate of one country
yields an increase in the tax rate of the other.
Given Assumptions (1 ) and (2 ), we deﬁne the Nash equilibrium, denoted by tN ≡ (tN1 , tN2 ), of the tax
competition game G: 
tN1 ≡ arg max
t1∈[0,1]
W 1 (t1, t2) t2 given,
tN2 ≡ arg max
t2∈[0,1]
W 2 (t2, t1) t1 given.
(3)
The First-Order conditions (FOCs) of (3) determine the best reply of each country, denoted by τi : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] such that
τi (tj) =
{
tj ∈ [0, 1] : W i1 (τi (tj) , tj) = 0
}
.
From Assumption (2.1) and the concavity of the W i (.) with respect to ti, the best reply τi (tj) is strictly
increasing in tj :
dτi (tj)
dtj
= −W
i
12 (τi (tj) , tj)
W i11 (τi (tj) , tj)
> 0.
An immediate consequence of the strategic complementarity of tax rates is the supermodularity of the tax
competition game and the existence of a Nash equilibrium. We have the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Under Assumption (2.1), there is always at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the tax
competition game.
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Proof. See Topkis (1998), Theorem 4.2.1 (Page 181), or Vives (1999), Theorem 2.5 (Page 33).
Several authors have studied the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a general standard tax competition model.
For instance, Bucovetsky (1991), Wildasin (1991), or Wilson (1991) speciﬁed their objective functions in such
a way that countries' best replies are linear and cross only once, ensuring the existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium. Laussel and Le Breton (1998) establish the existence of the Nash equilibrium in a more
general framework, but still under some restrictive assumptions: (i) the convexity of the marginal production
function, (ii) the linearity of the objective functions in public and private consumption, and (iii) the absence
of a capital owner in these functions.
By adopting a monotone comparative statics approach and assuming the strategic complementarity of tax
rates, we avoid the diﬃculties of establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium. We follow previous
analyses in industrial organization, where the notion of supermodularity has proved to be a valuable tool (see
the surveys of Amir, 2005; and Vives, 2005). Plain complementarity or substitutability does not aﬀect this
result, which continues to hold even when objective functions do not display the usual continuity properties
as they do for instance in Kanbur and Keen (1993).
For the stake of simplicity, we will restrict our analysis by assuming the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Assumption (3): The Nash equilibrium of the game G is unique.
We now consider the Stackelberg equilibrium of the preceding tax competition game, in which country i
leads and country j follows. We denote the equilibrium value of this game by
(
tLi , t
F
j
)
. We deﬁne the payoﬀ
function of the leader i by Li (ti) ≡W i (ti, τj (ti)). The result is given by

tLi ≡ arg max
ti∈[0,1]
Li (ti) ,
tFj ≡ max
{
min
{
τj
(
tLi
)
, 1
}
, 0
}
.
We assume an interior solution to the Stackelberg game.
Assumption (4): The payoﬀ function of the leader is concave, or equivalently
∀ti ∈ [0, 1] , d
2Li (ti)
dt2i
< 0. (4)
The Stackelberg problem is a special case of the bilevel optimization program, where the leader maximizes
its objective function under the constraint of the follower's maximization program. A signiﬁcant piece of
literature in operational research addresses this issue (see the survey of Colson, Marcotte, and Savard, 2007).
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However, to our knowledge, there is no general proof of the existence of an interior solution.15
2.2 Pareto improvement
In this subsection, we deﬁne Pareto improvement with respect to the status quo, that being the Nash
equilibrium of the standard tax competition game. We proceed in several steps. A preliminary Lemma is
established, relying on the concavity of the leader's objective function.
Lemma 2. The function Li (ti) ≡ W i (ti, τj (ti)) is strictly increasing in ti ∈
[
0, tLi
[
and strictly decreasing
in ti ∈
]
tLi , 1
]
.
Proof. This result derives directly from the deﬁnition of tLi as the global maximum and, from the assumed
concavity of Li (.) (Assumption 2.1).
We then establish a ranking of the equilibrium tax rates, which results from our assumptions of plain and
strategic complementarities.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4), there are three possible rankings:
 t
N
1 < t
F
1 6 tL1
tN2 < t
F
2 6 tL2
,
 t
N
1 < t
L
1 < t
F
1
tN2 < t
F
2 < t
L
2
, and
 t
N
1 < t
F
1 < t
L
1
tN2 < t
L
2 < t
F
2
,
where tFi ≡ τi
(
tLj
)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We note that Nash equilibrium tax rates are always lower than the Stackelberg leader's tax rate. By deter-
mining its tax rate, the leader anticipates the reaction of the follower. Due to the properties of plain and
strategic complementarities, any increase in the tax rate of the leader induces the follower to increase its
own tax rate. Such a move increases the welfare of the leader because the tax rate of the follower is a plain
complement. This ranking has been already established in Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010).
Combining Lemmas (2) and (3), we obtain the following
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4), we have
∀ti ∈
[
tNi , t
L
i
]
, W i (ti, τj (ti)) >W i
(
tNi , t
N
j
)
.
15Simaan and Cruz (1973) establish the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium when the actions' sets are compact. This result
applies to our context since the set of the studied actions is [0, 1]. However, it remains inadequate for establishing the existence
of an interior solution, since corner solutions may occur (tLi = 0 or t
L
i = 1).
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Proof. Immediate from Lemmas (2) and (3).
A country always prefers to lead than to play the simultaneous game. For ti = tLi , Lemma (4) corresponds
to the ﬁrst-mover incentive (W i
(
tLi , τj
(
tLi
))
> W i
(
tNi , t
N
j
)
). Lemma (4) may be viewed as an extension of
the ﬁrst-mover incentive.
We then deduce the following Proposition concerning the Pareto improvement with respect to the status quo.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4), a proﬁle of actions (ti, tj), such that ti ∈
[
tNi , t
L
i
]
and tj = τj (ti), is Pareto-improving.
Proof. For country i, we apply Lemma (4).
For country j, we have
W j (τj (ti) , ti) ≡ max
tj∈[0,1]
W j (tj , ti) >W j
(
tNj , ti
)
> W j
(
tNj , t
N
i
)
.
where the ﬁrst inequality is derived from the deﬁnition of the reaction function, and the second inequality
from the property of plain complementarity
(
W j2 (., .) > 0
)
, as well as from the fact that ti > tNi .
Pareto improvement is to be understood with respect to the Nash equilibrium of the standard tax competition
game. Proposition 1 contributes to the broader analysis done by Keen and Wildasin (2004), which deter-
mines the characterization of Pareto-eﬃcient tax structures applying Motzkin's theorem. Our result derives
directly from the monotone comparative statics and the properties of plain and strategic complementarity,
which determine the ranking of tax rates. In the presence of plain substitutes, for instance (and strategic
complements), the leader's tax rate at the Stackelberg equilibrium would be inferior to the Nash equilibrium
tax rate.16
3 The commitment game
We now develop a commitment game following Bade et al. (2009) and Renou (2009). We ﬁnd that countries
are able to commit by restricting their future policy choices. Such a commitment is self-enforcing: If country i
restricts its tax rate set to Ti ⊂ [0, 1], any action chosen later on must belong to Ti. We deﬁne a bilateral
commitment as a pair (T1, T2) where Ti is a non empty, compact, and convex subset of [0, 1]. Country i com-
mits to choose a tax rate ti in Ti ≡
[
ti, ti
]
, where ti
(
ti
)
is the minimum (maximum) of country i's restricted
16See Amir and Stepanova (2006) or Hoﬀmann and Rota-Graziosi (2012) in diﬀerent contexts.
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action space. The bilateral commitment T ≡ (T1, T2) induces the game G (T ) ≡
〈
{1, 2} , (Ti,W i)i∈{1,2}〉,
which results from game G (deﬁned in the preceding section) by limiting the action set of player i to Ti. A
unilateral commitment is a particular case of bilateral commitments, where one country does not commit or,
equivalently, commits to choose Ti = [0, 1]. A unilateral commitment is then equivalent to one of the two
Stackelberg games and then the commitment game would correspond to the endogenous timing game studied
in Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010).
The commitment game, denoted by ΓN (G), is a multiperiod game. In each period n = 1, ..., N , countries
simultaneously make some commitment by restricting their sets of available tax rates (Tni ). At the ﬁnal stage,
countries play the induced game G
(
TN
)
; they determine their tax rates in Tni noncooperatively. Bade et al.
(2009) establish an equivalence theorem between the multiperiod game and the two-period game.17 Thus, we
will focus our analysis on the following two-stage commitment game, denoted by Γ (G)
(≡ Γ2 (G)). In the
ﬁrst step, both countries simultaneously choose their tax policy sets Ti ≡
[
ti, ti
]
. In the second step, they
play the induced strategic form game G (T ), where T ≡ T1 × T2.
A strategy in the game Γ (G) is a pair
(
Ti, τ
Ti
i
)
, where the set Ti is an interval included in [0, 1], chosen at
the ﬁrst stage of the commitment game, and τTii is the induced best reply function of player i to the tax rate
of the player j, given their respective commitments.
Lemma 5. The best reply function of country i is given by
τTii : Tj → Ti
τTii (tj) =

ti if W
i
1
(
ti, tj
)
< 0
τi (tj) if W
i
1 (τi (tj) , tj) = 0
ti if W
i
1
(
ti, tj
)
> 0
Proof. Country i restricts its tax rate to Ti =
[
ti, ti
]
. IfW i1 (t
′
i, tj) = 0 for t
′
i < ti, then we haveW
i
1 (ti, tj) < 0
for any ti > t′i, since W
i
11 (ti, tj) < 0. We deduce that ∀ti ∈ Ti, W i1 (ti, tj) < 0. Country i cannot play t′i due
to its commitment and ∀ti ∈ Ti, W i (ti, tj) 6 W i
(
ti, tj
)
. Thus, the best reply to tj , given the commitment
on Ti, is τ
Ti
i (tj) = ti. If W
i
1 (t
′
i, tj) = 0 for t
′
i > ti, then ∀ti < t′i, W i1 (ti, tj) > 0. In particular, for any ti ∈ Ti,
we have W i1 (ti, tj) > 0, and W
i (ti, tj) 6W i
(
ti, tj
)
. Thus, the best reply function of country i to tj on Ti is
τTii (tj) = ti.
Best replies are constrained in the commitment game. These constraints are not imposed exogenously, but
they are endogenously chosen at the previous stages of the game. Adopting an alternative approach, Kalai
17Theorem 2 in Bade et al. (2009) states that for any number of stages (N), a proﬁle of actions t∗ is implementable in ΓN (G)
if and only if it is implementable in Γ2 (G).
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et al. (2010) deﬁne the grand reaction function Ti, which encompasses the set of available strategies and the
restricting best reply as Ti ≡
(
Ti, τ
Ti
i (tj)
)
.
We now determine the set of tax rates, which are Nash implementable through a bilateral commitment, that
is, the solution(s) of the preceding commitment game. Following the deﬁnition of Bade et al. (2009), we name
any bilateral commitment T , which has the following form ({ti} , [0, τj (ti)]) or ({ti} , [τj (ti) , 1]), as simple.
These authors establish a theorem, which states that any action proﬁle is implementable through a bilateral
commitment if and only if it is implementable by a simple commitment. This theorem signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes
our analysis by allowing us to focus only on simple commitments. We establish the following proposition:18
Proposition 2. Any tax coordination on rates
(
tci , t
c
j
)
, with tci ∈
[
tNi , t
L
i
]
and tcj ≡ τj (tci ), is (i) Nash
implementable through bilateral commitment and (ii) Pareto-improving with respect to the status quo.
Proof. (i) See Appendix A.2; (ii) Immediate from Proposition (1).
Considering the simple commitment we may provide some insight into this result: Country i commits to the
tax rate tci ∈
[
tNi , t
L
i
]
, while country j commits to the set [0, τj (tci )]. Country j has no incentive to deviate,
since it can always play its unconstrained best reply τj (tci ) to any committed tax rate t
c
i . If country i chooses
to deviate from tci to a lower tax rate t
′
i (t
′
i < t
c
i ), country j continues to play its unconstrained best reply
τj (t
′
i), and country i, which acts as a leader, would obtain a lower payoﬀ, since, by assumption, the leader's
payoﬀ function is concave, thus increasing over
[
0, tLi
]
and decreasing beyond (Li (t′i) < L
i (tci )). If country i
chooses to deviate from tci to the higher tax rate t
′
i, then country j is constrained in its reaction by its initial
commitment. In other words, country i raises its tax rate, while the other does not modify its own policy.
This yields a decrease in the payoﬀ of country i (W i1 (t
′
i, τj (t
c
i )) < W
i
1 (t
c
i , τj (t
c
i ))).
From Proposition (2), we obtain an immediate Corollary, which deﬁnes tax rates as implementable through
commitments.
Corollary 1. Tax rates ti, such as ti < min
{
tN1 , t
N
2
}
, or ti > max
{
tL1 , t
F
1 , t
L
2 , t
F
2
}
, are not achievable through
commitments.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition (2), we deduce that the commitment to choose ti < tNi or ti > t
L
i is
not self-enforcing. Indeed, country i is always incited to deviate from its commitment. Similarly, any tax rate
ti > max
{
tL1 , t
F
1 , t
L
2 , t
F
2
}
is not self-enforcing.
18The commitment game Γ (G) always has an equilibrium. Indeed, the Nash equilibrium of the initial game G is an equilibrium
of the commitment game. If both countries commit to playing their Nash equilibrium tax rates, no country would gain by
deviating from its commitment. Each player would then choose the strategy
({
tNi
}
, τNi (T )
)
, where T =
{
tNi
} × {tNj }, and
τNi (T ) = t
N
i . Given the restriction of country i to play
{
tNi
}
, country j cannot increase its welfare by changing his action space
(Tj).
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A minimum tax rate, denoted by tmin, is then implementable through voluntary commitment if tmin ∈[
tNi , t
L
i
]∩ [tNj , tLj ]. Such mechanism allows unambiguously a Pareto improving tax coordination. This result
highlights a noticeable diﬀerence between commitment games and inﬁnitely repeated games of tax compe-
tition. Indeed, Kiss (2012) shows how a minimum tax rate would reduce the threat of punishment and
jeopardize the sustainability of tax cooperation. Rather, voluntary commitment on a minimum tax rate does
not aﬀect countries' capacity to coordinate.
Beyond tax coordination and minimum tax rates, tax harmonization has been also largely studied in the
tax competition literature. It consists of establishing the same tax rate among countries and it appears
particularly appealing between sovereign countries. Indeed, by deﬁnition, harmonization eliminates tax
spillover without any centralization, that is, any delegation of taxing power to a supranational authority.
However, harmonization derives usually from an ad hoc assumption in the literature, rarely from government
behavior. Using the previous simple commitment mechanism, we determine under which conditions a country
can commit to a speciﬁc tax rate such that the best reply of the other country corresponds exactly to this same
tax rate. Tax harmonization occurs here at the SPNE of our commitment game. We obtain the following
Proposition:
Proposition 3. A tax harmonization on the tax rate th is Nash implementable by commitment if and only
if  t
h ∈ [tN1 , tL1 ] ∩ [tN2 , tL2 ]
∃i ∈ {1, 2} , such as τTii
(
th
)
= th.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the Proposition derives directly from Proposition (2): A harmonized tax rate th is
Nash implementable through bilateral commitments if
(
th, th
) ∈ [tNi , tLi ] × [tNj , τj (tLi )] or, equivalently, if
th ∈ [tN1 , tL1 ] ∩ [tN2 , tL2 ]. The second part of the Proposition deﬁnes the harmonized tax rate.
It is not possible to ascertain the existence of a harmonized tax rate in general. The geometric approach of
tax harmonization provides some insight. Harmonization involves identifying the value of the tax rate, where
at least one country's best reply intersects the ﬁrst diagonal. Appendix A.3 describes two cases: the ﬁrst one
corresponds to the situation, where no country's best reply intersects the ﬁrst diagonal, (e.g., tN1 < t
N
2 , t
L
1 <
tL2 , and t
L
1 < t
F
2 ), while in the second case, both best replies intersect the ﬁrst diagonal (e.g., t
N
1 < t
N
2 , t
L
1 < t
L
2 ,
and tL1 > t
F
2 ). Assuming that reaction functions are contractions,
19 is still insuﬃcient for solving this issue.
Indeed, following Banach's ﬁxed-point theorem, every contraction mapped on a nonempty complete metric
space, in this case any interval included in [0, 1], has a unique ﬁxed point. Consequently, the harmonized tax
19This relies on Assumption (3), relating to the uniqueness of game G's Nash equilibrium.
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rate th exists for each country. However, it may not belong to the interval I ≡ [tN1 , tL1 ] ∩ [tN2 , tL2 ], and is not
always Nash implementable through a bilateral commitment.
From the preceding Proposition, we deduce the following Corollary:
Corollary 2. If
[
tN1 , t
L
1
]∩[tN2 , tL2 ] = ∅, then tax harmonization is not possible through a bilateral commitment.
Here, tax coordination and tax harmonization result from noncooperative behaviors. They are Pareto-
improving and self-enforcing through voluntary restrictions. While tax coordination is always feasible as
long as our assumptions hold, tax harmonization may be impossible. When countries diﬀer too much in size,
initial factor endowments, productivity, or preferences for public goods, any equilibrium tax rates are such
that the interval I is empty. An excessive asymmetry prevents tax harmonization.
Proposition (3) and Corollary (2) complete some preceding studies on tax harmonization. For instance,
Kanbur and Keen (1993, Proposition 9, Page 886) establish that harmonization with any rate between the
Nash equilibrium tax rates harms one of the two countries, typically the smaller one. Wang (1999) obtains
a similar conclusion by focusing on harmonization with any rate between the Stackelberg equilibrium rates
(Proposition 5, Page 978). Konrad (2009) shows that a nonbinding minimum tax rate, a tax rate below the
Stackelberg follower's, may induce more harmful tax competition. We complete these results by deﬁning
which tax rates are Pareto-improving with respect to the Nash equilibrium of the basic game (Proposition 2).
Our results contrast with those of Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Zissimos and Wooders (2008), which
emphasize the distributional property of tax harmonization and conclude with its limited applicability. We
show that not only are there some levels of harmonized tax rates for which both countries increase their
respective payoﬀs, but also that these rates are Nash implementable through commitments. Complete har-
monization is then possible in a decentralized way, that is at the equilibrium of a non cooperative game. By
considering voluntary restriction as the mechanism for achieving tax coordination and even harmonization,
we provide a rationale for some existing practices, such as tax rate ranges, minimum and maximum tax rates,
etc.
Before presenting a quadratic illustration of our analysis, we raise the question of whether voluntary commit-
ment diﬀers from cheap talk, that is, costless, nonbinding, and nonveriﬁable messages as deﬁned by Farrell
and Rabin, 1996. Indeed, the commitment game we develop is characterized by multiple preplay stages similar
to communication games, where players can communicate before choosing their respective actions. This ques-
tion is related to the scope of our analysis: If self-enforcing commitments are equivalent to cheap talk in the
studied game, then any communication between governments is suﬃcient for establishing Pareto-improving
tax coordination. Following the relevant literature, we will say that cheap talk, or costless communication, is
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eﬀective for solving the tax coordination issue if the tax competition game displays two necessary credibility
properties: the self-committing condition as deﬁned by Farrell (1988), and the self-signaling condition, a
stronger requirement emphasized by Aumann (1990). We establish the following Corollary:
Corollary 3. Under Assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4), cheap talk is neither self-committing nor self-
signaling in the tax competition game.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
We conclude that self-enforcing commitment cannot be reduced to cheap talk, or in other words, cheap talk
is ineﬀective for inducing Pareto-improving tax coordination, while commitment is. Communication between
governments on tax policy issues is insuﬃcient for achieving tax coordination.
4 Illustrations with linear reaction functions
We apply our analysis to two types of tax competition: commodity tax competition and capital tax compe-
tition, where countries' reaction functions are linear.
4.1 Commodity tax competition
The formalization of the commodity tax competition is usually based on a spatial representation of the world
à la Hotelling.20 Let us consider two countries, spatially represented by an interval [−1, 1], that share a border
in b > 0. Inhabitants of each country purchase goods at home or abroad depending on the diﬀerence in tax
rates, and on their respective transportation costs. The unitary transport cost is denoted by d > 0.21 In
Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Nielsen (2001), each country maximizes its tax revenue. Assuming that country
1 is the smaller, we obtain the following objective functions, which correspond to countries' tax revenues:22
W 1 (t1, t2) = t1
(
1 + b+
t2 − t1
d
)
, W 2 (t2, t1) = t2
(
1− b+ t1 − t2
d
)
.
20Authors diﬀer by their measures of the distance function, that is, transport's cost. For instance, while Kanbur and Keen
(1993) consider the absolute value, Nielsen (2001) uses a quadratic function. This latter speciﬁcation displays the nice property
to induce a continuously diﬀerentiable objective function. We assert that our analysis remains valid with the speciﬁcation of
Kanbur and Keen (1993), since their game is supermodular.
21Keen and Konrad (2012) provide an alternative view to this kind of model, where countries compete with regards to tax
rate, and ﬁrms are able to transfer their proﬁts from one jurisdiction to another, proﬁt-shifting being costly.
22See expressions (2, p. 603) in Nielsen (2001).
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The equilibrium tax rates are then23
tN1 =
d
3 (3 + b), t
N
2 =
d
3 (3− b),
tL1 =
d
2 (3 + b), t
L
2 =
d
2 (3− b).
Tax harmonization is possible and implementable through commitments in the Nielsen model, under the
condition that the two countries do not diﬀer dramatically in size, more speciﬁcally b ≤ 1/3. Thus, under
this condition, the unique harmonized tax rate th = d(1 + b) is implementable through the following simple
bilateral commitment: country 2 (the smaller country) commits to th, country 1 commits choosing its tax
rate in T 1 = [0, τ1(th)]. Since τ1T 1(th) = th, tax harmonization occurs and is Pareto-improving:
W 1
(
th, th
)
= (1 + b) 2d > (1 + b/3)2d = W 1
(
tN1 , t
N
2
)
,
W 2
(
th, th
)
=
(
1− b2) d > (1− b/3)2d = W 2 (tN2 , tN1 ) for b ∈ [0, 1/3].
When countries diﬀer moderately in size (1/3 < b < 3/5), tax harmonization is not reachable through
voluntary commitments, while Pareto-improving tax coordination remains possible on the following tax rates:
(tc1, t
c
2) ∈ [d(3 + b)/3, d(3 + b)/2]× [d(3− b)/3, d(3− b)/2]. Finally, when asymmetry is suﬃciently important
(b > 3/5), commitment is useless for achieving any tax coordination. In other terms, the Nash equilibrium
of the standard commodity tax competition game, as described in Nielsen (2001), is commitment robust.
4.2 Capital tax competition
We consider a two-country version of the workhorse model of the international capital tax competition
proposed by Keen and Konrad (2013). Two countries compete by tax rate to attract capital, which is perfectly
mobile between them and is ﬁxed in total supply. The representative resident in country i is endowed with
a share (θi) of worldwide capital, denoted by k. We have ∀i ∈ {1, 2} , 0 6 θi 6 1, and θ1 + θ2 6 1. A single
homogenous good is produced in each country using inputs of labor and capital. The representative resident
in each country supplies one unit of labor. The production function, which is assumed to be concave in its
two inputs, and homogenous of degree one, is represented in terms of the capital-labor ratio, denoted by ki.
We consider the following quadratic form: fi (k) = (ai − bk) k, with a1 > a2 > 0 and bi > 0.
The perfect mobility of capital involves the following capital market clearing conditions:
 f
′
1 (k1)− t1 = f ′1 (k2)− t2 = r
k1 + k2 = k
, (5)
23Plain and strategic complementarities are always respected.
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where r is the net return of capital. The total income of the representative inhabitant in country i is then
xi = fi (ki)− f ′i (ki) ki + rθik.
Capital is taxed at the source, and all government revenue is spent on the public good: gi = tiki. We simplify
our analysis by assuming a constant marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption,
which is equal to 1 + λi. The objective function of each country is given by Ui (xi, gi) ≡ xi + (1 + λi) gi.
Substituting xi and gi by their previous respective expression we obtain
W i (ti, tj) = fi (ki)− f ′i (ki) ki + rθik + (1 + λi) tiki.
Given the market clearing conditions (5) reaction functions are deﬁned by
ti (tj) ≡ argmaxti∈[0,1]W i (ti, tj) =
3
3 + 4λ
[
(1 + 2λ) tj + (1 + 2λ)
(
ai − aj + 2bk
)
+ bθik
]
.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the following values of the parameters: λ = 1 and k = 1. Relevant
equilibrium tax rates are
tNi =
3 (ai − aj) + b (15− 7θi − 3θj)
10
, tLi =
12 (ai − aj) + b (60− 35θi − 12θj)
26
. (6)
Pareto-improving tax coordination is possible as long as tNi < t
L
j or, equivalently,
ai − aj
b
>
105 + 31θi − 136θj
99
.
Moreover, if a1 > a2, a harmonized tax rate equal to th = 34 (a1 − a2 + 2b) + bθ1 may be implemented
through commitment.24 We turn to numerical simulations since the number of parameters involves tedious
expressions.25 Figure 1 displays countries' reaction functions for the following set of parameters: a1 =
129/128 > a2 = 1, b = 1/4, k¯ = 1, and θ1 = 1/32 < θ2 = 31/64. The blue area represents the commitment
game' set of equilibrium tax rates: (tc1, t
c
2) ∈
[
tN1 , t
L
1
] × [tN2 , tL2 ]. Tax harmonization occurs when the ﬁrst
bisector (t2 = t1) intercepts country 1's reaction function curb in tH .26 In contrast, Figure 2 displays
countries' reaction functions with a1 = 159/107 > a2 = 1, b = 1/4, k¯ = 1, and θ1 = 3/655 < θ2 = 7/1189.
Tax harmonization through commitment is impossible, since
(
tH , tH
)
/∈ [tN1 , tL1 ]× [tN2 , tL2 ].
24If if a1 < a2, the harmonized tax rate is th =
3
4
(a2 − a1 + 2b) + bθ2.
25A Mathematica ﬁle presenting our computations is available upon request.
26We note that
(
tH , tH
) ∈ [tN1 , tL1 ]× [tN2 , tL2 ].
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Figure 1: Tax coordination and tax harmonization are possible through commitment.
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Figure 2: Tax harmonization is not possible.
5 Conclusion
We consider countries' commitment capacities in the context of international tax competition. The studied
commitment technology involves voluntary restrictions on tax rates. Under the assumptions of plain and
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strategic complementarities, the Nash equilibrium tax rates are lower than those ﬁxed by the leader in the
two Stackelberg games. These rates determine the set of tax rates, on which any coordination through bilateral
commitments is mutually beneﬁcial. We also show that a complete tax harmonization is Nash implementable
and Pareto-improving as long as the asymmetry between countries remains limited. Analytical illustrations
allow us applying our results to the quadratic speciﬁcation of commodity tax competition and capital tax
competition.
Voluntary commitment is an integral part of transgovernmentalism and other new governance methods on
the international scene. Studying the European economic and political integration processes, Majone (2005)
highlights the obsolescence of the Community method and its standard federalist approach, which essentially
consists of delegating competences to a supranational institution.27 He concludes that there is a need for
alternative methods by which member states can credibly commit themselves to a collective action. One
of them is the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) deﬁned by the Lisbon Council of March 2000. It
consists of soft law mechanisms, such as guidelines, peer reviews, benchmarking, and the sharing of best
practices.28 Establishing nonbinding but self-enforcing rules appears to be a viable alternative. These rules
avoid several of the pitfalls of binding agreements, such as the bargaining of content and the monitoring
of eﬀective enforcement. Illustrations of potential nonbinding political commitments in tax competition
are the Code of Conduct for business taxation signed by the EU Member States in December 1997, the
OECD initiative undertaken in 1998 to limit "harmful tax competition" or the more recent OECD/G20 Base
Erosion and Proﬁt Shifting project for curbing avoidance by multinational enterprises. These examples try
to support some regional or global tax regulation. However, the issue remains to determine (empirically) if
such initiatives or projects are only cheap talk or eﬀective voluntary commitments.29
Several restrictions limit the scope of our analysis. First, critics of the standard tax competition apply here,
too. In particular, the studied tax policy remains unidimensional, apprehended through tax rates only, while
the multidimensionality of national tax system (e.g., tax base deﬁnition and tax policy enforcement) matters
a great deal, as stressed by Robinson and Slemrod (2012).30 However, we note that tax rates considered
here may be eﬀective ones, which encompass not only statutory tax rates, but also the other dimensions of
27The agreement on a minimum rate of 15 percent for the value-added tax (VAT) between EU member states may be considered
as an example of such an approach in tax policy. However, the coordination of the European VAT system remains far from
complete.
28Ania and Wagener (2013) present the OMC as an imitative learning dynamic, where some countries mimic best practices
already in place in others. They use the notion of evolutionary stable strategies and highlight the fact that some coordination
occurs in a subset of Nash equilibriums. However, this subset is not linked to eﬃcient outcomes. In other words, the OMC, as a
learning dynamic, does not systematically lead to a Pareto-superior equilibrium.
29For Radaelli (2003) the Code of Conduct may have induced some convergence in the discussions between the ﬁnance ministers
regarding harmful tax competition. However, this convergence in ﬁnance ministers' speeches does not mean a convergence of
actual tax policy.
30Public spending is also a key element of ﬁscal competition.
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tax system. Second, our assumptions of plain and strategic complementarities, and the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium, are restrictive. They may be relaxed, since the theorem of Bade et al. (2009) holds for
more general forms of the reaction functions. Finally, one of the main constraints is the number of players,
which is limited to two. Developing an n-player commitment game remains an issue for future research. The
application of the notion of the grand reaction function, as deﬁned by Kalai et al. (2010), would be useful.
The purpose of our analysis is not to formalize actual negotiations among countries for achieving some tax
coordination. Following the implementation theory, our approach remains mainly normative. The simple
commitment mechanism we consider is a convenient tool for identifying which and how countries may coor-
dinate and even harmonize. We stress that By establishing the point that coordination and harmonization
may be achievable within a decentralized equilibrium, we state that supranational authority is not indispens-
able to international coordination. Successive nonbinding but self-enforcing commitments would be useful in
attaining a Pareto-superior equilibrium. These commitments are not equivalent to cheap talk; they are more
than that (see Corollary 3). Further research may be devoted to developing a successful path of commitments
through mutual adjustments, which involves Pareto-improving coordination. Finally, our approach may be
useful for formalizing interactions between sovereign countries in contexts other than that of tax competition,
for example in international trade, environmental economics, or macroeconomic models, where coordination
failures prevail (see Cooper and John (1988)).
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Appendix
A.1 Lemma (3)
From the deﬁnition of the Stackelberg and Nash equilibriums, we always have
Li
(
tLi
)
= W i
(
tLi , τj
(
tLi
)) ≡ max
ti∈[0,1]
W i (ti, τj (ti)) >W i
(
tNi , τj
(
tNi
))
= W i
(
tNi , t
N
j
)
. (7)
We establish that tNj < τj
(
tLi
)
. Let us consider by contradiction, that tNj > τj
(
tLi
) ≡ tFi . In that case, the
plain complementary assumption would yield
W i
(
tNi , t
N
j
) ≡ max
ti∈[0,1]
W i
(
ti, t
N
j
)
>W i
(
tLi , t
N
j
)
> W i
(
tLi , t
F
j
)
,
which contradicts (7). Thus, we always have,
τj
(
tLi
)
= tFi > t
N
j , i = A,B. (8)
The FOC of the leader's maximization program in the Stackelberg game is
dLi (ti)
dti
= 0⇔W i1
(
tLi , τj
(
tLi
))
+W i2
(
tLi , τj
(
tLi
)) dτj (ti)
dti
∣∣∣∣
tLi
= 0.
From the plain and strategic complementarity assumptions, we have
W i2
(
tLi , τj
(
tLi
)) dτj (ti)
dti
∣∣∣∣
tLi
> 0,
which induces
W i1
(
tLi , τj
(
tLi
))
6 0 = W i1
(
tNi , t
N
j
)
. (9)
From the concavity of W i (ti, tj) with respect to ti, inequalities (8) and (9) involve
tLi > tNi . (10)
Applying backward induction to solve the Stackelberg game, the FOC of the follower is
∀tj ∈ [0, 1] , W i1
(
tFi , tj
)
= 0. (11)
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From (9) and (11), we deduce that
W i1
(
tLi , t
F
j
)
6 0 = W i1
(
tFi , t
L
j
)
. (12)
We consider two cases:
If tLi < t
F
i , the concavity of W
i (.) with respect to ti involves
W i1
(
tLi , t
F
j
)
> W i1
(
tFi , t
F
j
)
.
From (12), we obtain
W i1
(
tFi , t
F
j
)
< W i1
(
tFi , t
L
j
)
,
and the strategic complementarity of W i (.) yields
tFj < t
L
i .
If tLi > t
F
i , inequality (12) and the concavity of W
i (.) with respect to ti involve an ambiguous result:
tLj ≷ tFj .
Thus, three possible rankings are possible:
 t
N
1 < t
F
1 6 tL1
tN2 < t
F
2 6 tL2
,
 t
N
1 < t
L
1 < t
F
1
tN2 < t
F
2 < t
L
2
and
 t
N
1 < t
F
1 < t
L
1
tN2 < t
L
2 < t
F
2
A.2 Proof of Proposition (2)
A.2.1 Preliminary results
Several preliminary results may be deduced from the three assumptions we have made. They will be useful
in establishing our main Proposition.
Lemma 6. We have the following expressions:
For ti 6 τi (tj) , W i1 (ti, tj) > 0,
For ti > τi (tj) , W
i
1 (ti, tj) < 0.
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This Lemma derives from the deﬁnition of the best reply function and the concavity ofW i (ti, tj) with respect
to ti.
Lemma 7. We have the following expressions:

∀t ∈ [0, tNi [ , τi (τj (t)) > t,
∀t ∈ ]tNi , 1] , τi (τj (t)) < t,
t = tNi , τi (τj (t)) = t.
Proof. Following Bade et al. (2009) we establish this result by contradiction. According to the deﬁnition of
the Nash equilibrium, we have τi
(
τj
(
tNi
))
= τi
(
tNj
)
= tNi . The function τi (τj (t)) − t is zero at the Nash
equilibrium only, and is either positive or negative for t 6= tNi . Assume that τi (τj (t))− t < 0 for any t < tNi .
We then have for t = 0, τi (τj (0))− 0 = τi (τj (0)) < 0, which contradicts τi (t) > 0 for any t.
Lemma 8. W i (t, τj (ti)) is increasing in t ∈ [0, τi (τj (ti))] and decreasing in t ∈ [τi (τj (ti)) , 1].
Proof. Let us consider W i (t, τj (ti)). The deﬁnition of the reaction function τi (.) involves
W i1 (τi (τj (ti)) , τj (ti)) = 0.
From the concavity of W i11 (., .) with respect to ti, we deduce that
W i1 (t, τj (ti)) > 0⇔ t < τi (τj (ti)) ,
W i1 (t, τj (ti)) < 0⇔ t > τi (τj (ti)) .
A.2.2 Proof of the proposition
Consider that country i commits to a level of tax rate ti ∈
[
tNi , t
L
i
]
and country j commits to an interval of
tax rate [0, τj (ti)].
1. First, we establish that country j has no incentive to deviate from its commitment. If country i commits
to ti and plays ti, country j is able to play its unconstrained best reply, maximizing its welfare level:
τj (ti) = arg max
ti∈[0,1]
W j (tj , ti) .
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2. Secondly, we establish that country i has no incentive to deviate from its commitment {ti} if and only if
ti ∈
[
tNi , t
L
i
]
. Following Bade et al. (2009), we focus on simple commitments, in particular, country i's
commitment to {ti} and country j's commitment to [0, τj (ti)].
(a) When country i commits to a level of tax rate ti ∈
[
tNi , t
L
i
]
, it should have no incentive to deviate.
i. If t′i < ti, then τ
[0,τj(ti)]
j (t
′
i) = τj (t
′
i). From ti ∈
[
tNi , t
L
i
] ⊂ [0, tLi ], it yields
Li (t′i) = W
i (t′i, τj (t
′
i)) < W
i (ti, τj (ti)) = L
i (ti) ,
since Li (.) is increasing over
[
0, tLi
]
(see Lemma 2), and t′i < ti 6 tLi .
ii. If t′i > ti, then τ
[0,τj(ti)]
j (t
′
i) = τj (ti). From Lemma (7), we have ti > τi (τj (ti)) and we
know from Lemma (7) that W i (t, τj (ti)) is decreasing in t for∀t > τi (τj (ti)). In considering
t′i > ti > τi (τj (ti)), we deduce that
W i (t′i, τj (ti)) < W
i (ti, τj (ti)) .
(b) When country i commits to a level of tax rate ti < tNi , we show that it has an incentive to deviate
from this level in the commitment game Γ (G). Since ti < tNi , we have have from Lemma (7):
ti < τi (τj (ti)). Let consider t′i such that ti < t
′
i < τi (τj (ti)), we have τ
[0,τj(ti)]
j (t
′
i) = τj (ti) since
ti < t
′
i. From Lemma (8), we deduce that
W i (t′i, τj (ti)) > W
i (ti, τj (ti)) .
Country i has an incentive to deviate from ti by ﬁxing t′i (> ti).
(c) When country i commits to a level of tax rate ti > tLi , we show that it has incentive to deviate
from this level in the commitment game Γ (G). Consider t′i < ti, then τ
[0,τj(ti)]
j (t
′
i) = τj (t
′
i). Since
the function Li (.) is decreasing over
[
tLi , 1
]
, we deduce that:y
Li (t′i) > L
i (ti) .
Country i has an incentive to deviate from ti by ﬁxing t′i < ti.
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A.3 On the existence of an harmonized tax rate
Let us consider that tN1 < t
N
2 , t
L
1 < t
L
2 , and t
L
1 < t
F
2 . We have I =
[
tN1 , t
L
1
]∩ [tN2 , tL2 ] = [tN2 , tL1 ]. We establish
that no best reply intersects the ﬁrst diagonal over the interval I. By assumption, we have
τ I1
(
tN2
)
= tN1 < t
N
2 .
From Lemmas (7) and (3), we deduce that
tL1 > t
N
1 ⇒ tL1 > τ I1
(
τ I2
(
tL1
))
= τ I1
(
tF2
)
.
Since τ I1 (.) is increasing, and t
F
2 > t
L
1 , by assumption, we obtain
tL1 > τ
I
1
(
tF2
)
> τ I1
(
tL1
)
.
We conclude that the best reply of country 1 is always below the ﬁrst diagonal on interval I:
∀t ∈ I, τ I1 (t) < t. (13)
Let us consider country 2. By assumption, we have
τ I2
(
tN1
)
= tN2 > t
N
1 .
Similarly, by assumption, we have
τ I2
(
tL1
)
= tF2 > t
L
1 .
Thus, we deduce that the best reply of country 2 is also always below the ﬁrst diagonal on interval I:
∀t ∈ I, τ I2 (t) < t.
Consider tN1 < t
N
2 , t
L
1 < t
L
2 , and t
L
1 > t
F
2 . We have I =
[
tN2 , t
L
1
]
. First, by assumption, we have
 τ
I
2
(
tN1
)
= tN2 > t
N
1
τ I2
(
tL1
)
= tF2 < t
L
1
.
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In other words, the best reply of country 2 intersects the diagonal on interval I. For country 1, we have
τ I1
(
tN2
)
= tN1 < t
N
2 .
From Lemmas (7) and (3), we deduce that
tL1 > t
N
1 ⇒ tL1 > τ I1
(
τ I2
(
tL1
))
= τ I1
(
tF2
)
.
Since τ I1 (.) is increasing, and, by assumption t
F
2 < t
L
1 we obtain
τ I1
(
tF2
)
< τ I1
(
tL1
)
.
Thus, we have
τ I1
(
tL1
)
≷ tL1 .
The best reply of country 1 may intersect the diagonal.
A.4 Corollary (3)
Following Baliga and Morris (2002), who study games with plain and strategic complementarities in industrial
organization, we consider the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1. Action ti is self-committing if
W i (ti, τj (ti)) > W
i (t′i, τj (t
′
i)) for ∀t′i ∈ [0, 1] .
By deﬁnition, only the leader's tax rate at the Stackelberg equilibrium tLi is self-committing on [0, 1].
Deﬁnition 2. Action ti is self-signaling if
W i (ti, τj (ti)) > W
i (t′i, tj) for ∀ (t′i, tj) ∈ [0, 1]2 .
Given the plain complementarity, we have
W i (ti, τj (ti)) < W
i (ti, t
′
i) for t
′
i > τj (ti) .
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Under the assumption of plain and strategic complementarities,31 each country is always incited to induce
the other country to raise its tax rate. The self-signaling condition does not hold here.
31These results have already been established by Baliga and Morris (2002) in industrial organization.
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